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After the partition of British India in 1947, many 
pilgrimage sites important for the Sikhs – followers of 
a medieval poet-mystic and philosopher Guru Nanak 
(1469-1539) – turned out to be at different sides of the 
Indian-Pakistani border. Radcliff’s line cut the Punjab 
province, home region for the majority of Sikhs in South 
Asia, into two parts. As a result, the towns of Nankana 
Sahib, Guru Nanak’s birthplace, and Kartarpur, his 
residence for the last 18 years of life, remained within 
Pakistani territory. Gurdwaras (places where Sikhs come 
together for congregational worship) located in those 
towns represent the ultimate pilgrimage destinations for 
Sikhs, over 21 million1 of whom currently live in India.
Kartarpur boasts a special place in the history of 
Sikhism; it was the place where Guru Nanak took up his 
residence after long pilgrimages to different destinations 
in India and elsewhere, and continued to preach his 
1  India’s state of Punjab is home to 16 million Sikhs (77% 
of India’s Sikh community) who in turn account for 58% 
of the population of the state (Census of India 2011). 
faith that incorporated a variety of ideas from medieval 
Bhakti (sometimes called ‘mystical Hinduism’)2 and 
Sufism (a mystical belief in Islam). It was in Kartarpur 
that he worked in the fields together with his two sons 
implementing the idea that worldly duties and gṛhastha 
(householder) dharma inseparably associated with 
individual spiritual quest should be the core of human 
life. In Kartarpur, Guru Nanak established his first free 
kitchen or langar where any traveller or a person in need 
was provided food and shelter irrespective of faith, caste, 
age, sex, or social status. Guru Nanak’s disciples – Sikhs 
– have been doing their best to follow these principles 
ever since.3
2  Bhakti (love, devotion, dedication) represented a blend 
of medieval religious reform ideas popular in North India, 
which focused on private relationship between an adept 
and a deity. 
3  The history of Sikhism and its current specifics is 
discussed in Jacobsen et al., 2017; Uspenskaya, Kotin, 
2007. For details of langar’s role in Sikhism see 
Bochkovskaya, 2018:300-312; Khokhlova, 2018:313-322.
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After the partition of British India in 1947, many pilgrimage sites important for the Sikhs – followers 
of a medieval poet-mystic and philosopher Guru Nanak (1469-1539) – turned out to be at different 
sides of the Indian-Pakistani border. The towns of Nankana Sahib and Kartarpur (Guru Nanak’s 
birthplace, and residence for the last 18 years of his life, respectively) remained within Pakistani 
territory. Gurdwaras located there represent utmost pilgrimage destinations, the Sikhs’ ‘Mecca and 
Medina’.
Owing to Indian-Pakistani relations that have deteriorated throughout seven decades, pilgrimage to 
Kartarpur has been extremely difficult for India’s citizens. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, official 
negotiations were launched concerning the possibility of setting up a visa-free pilgrimage corridor 
that would allow Indian Sikhs to easily reach the Kartarpur Sahib gurdwara. The potential corridor 
was perceived by many as a channel for cultural cooperation and the embodiment of a zone of peace 
at the ‘line of mutual hatred’ – as the India-Pakistan border has often been referred to. Negotiations 
received a new impetus when the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) party headed by Imran Khan came 
to power in 2018. On November 9, 2019, three days before Guru Nanak’s 550th birth anniversary, 
the Kartarpur corridor was inaugurated by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. 
This paper discusses the history of and the potential perspectives concerning the Kartarpur pilgrimage 
corridor drawing upon the concepts of borders as processes, sets of sociocultural practices, symbols, 
institutions, and networks that permanently adopt new meanings and functions.
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Pakistan, the political border has become an important 
tool used for ‘othering’ (Paasi, 2020:1-8; Houtum & 
Naerssen, 2002:126). 
Such a role for the border is enhanced through its 
performance at the few sites and crossings that currently 
exist at the ‘line of mutual hatred’ – a common definition 
of the Indian-Pakistani frontier (The Economist, July 
24, 2017). Along the entire 3,300km border line there 
are only two passages: the Attari-Wagah crossing in 
Punjab located 32km from Amritsar, India and 24 km 
In the 16th century, Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib (Figure 
1) was set up at Guru Nanak’s death place; it was rebuilt 
in the 1920s by the Sikh ruler of Patiala. Today it is 
considered the largest gurdwara in the world covering a 
territory of some 6 square kilometres. Located at the west 
bank of the Ravi River at a distance of 4 km from the 
international border, the Kartarpur Sahib is clearly visible 
from the east – India’s – bank. However, from August 
1947 until November 2019, when a special pilgrimage 
passage to Kartarpur was established, it had remained 
virtually out of reach for Sikhs residing in India. That 
is why in India’s town of Dera Nanak Sahib across the 
border, a special site had been set up allowing darshan 
(viewing) of the inaccessible Kartarpur Sahib (Figure 2).
Contextualizing the Kartarpur Corridor
The Indian-Pakistani border is typical in the so-called 
traditional understanding of boundaries as fixed lines, or 
physical or material entities (Paasi, 2011:11-31; Houtum, 
2005:672-679). It is a line that can be interpreted as a 
‘fact on the ground’ (Agnew, 2008:175) that is absolutely 
visible and strictly guarded for its entire length. In 
1947, it split the historical and cultural community of 
Punjab that featured a mix of religions and cultures; 
an overwhelming majority of Muslims shifted to West 
Punjab while Hindus and Sikhs had to migrate to the 
eastern part of the region. Since then for both India and 
Figure 2: Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib, Pakistan, as 
seen from darshan place (viewpoint) at Dera Nanak 
Sahib, India 
(Photo by Bishwanath Ghosh, The Hindu, Nov. 22, 2018)
Figure 1: Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib, Pakistan
 
(Photo by PTI, Hindustan Times, Nov. 09, 2019)
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intentions, but to an extent also as a symbol of goodwill 
and cooperation between the two countries. A similar, but 
smaller-scale and less pompous performance, takes place 
at the Ganda Singh Wala – Hussainiwala checkpoint, also 
in Punjab. The border crossing there was closed several 
decades ago, but the lowering of flags ceremony has been 
held at the site every day since 1970 (Jeychandran 2016: 
181–202).
These performances are generally supposed to visually 
confirm a separating role of the sealed border. They aim at 
physical demonstration of a boundary between ‘Us’ and 
‘Them’, which reflects the specificity of relations between 
India and Pakistan. At the same time, such performances 
and practices make the border an ideological entity 
(Paasi, 1998:74) verifying the argument that never being 
neutral lines, 
borders are often pools of emotions, fears, and 
memories that can be mobilized space for both 
progressive and regressive purposes (Johnson et 
al., 2011:61-69). 
To this end, borders are both symbols and institutions 
that ‘simultaneously produce distinctions between social 
groups and are produced by them’ (Paasi, 1998:80). 
Notably, as institutions, they construct a continuity for 
social interaction by linking the past, present, and future 
from Lahore, Pakistan, and the Munabao-Khokhrapar 
railway crossing between India’s state of Rajasthan and 
Pakistan’s Sindh province.
One of the most famous manifestations of the border is a 
large-scale and colourful ceremony of lowering the flags 
(Beating Retreat) held almost every evening since the late 
1950s at the Attari-Wagah crossing in Punjab: tall officers 
wearing red (India) and black (Pakistan) turbans with 
fan-shape decorations march, menacingly gesticulate, 
and roll their eyes, as if trying to scare their counterparts 
across the border. Even so, when closing up at the border 
line, they show utmost uniformity of movements and 
gestures, a result of joint drills. The pompous 45-minute 
show ends at sunset by opening the massive iron gates 
(the border per se) and synchronised lowering of the 
flags Figures 3 & 4). With perfect coordination, the two 
flags are carefully taken off the ropes, neatly folded and 
carried away. Indian and Pakistani officers shake hands, 
after which the iron gates remain closed until the next 
evening. The dramatic and spectacular show at the border 
draws thousands of visitors at each side, with foreign 
tourists among them. 
Performed jointly by the Indian Border Security Force 
and Pakistan Rangers, the emotional ritual is generally 
perceived as a mutual demonstration of aggressive 
Figure 3: Lowering the Flags at the Attari-Wagah Crossing
Author’s Images
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A Thorny Way to Separated Shrines
Owing to the specifics of Indian-Pakistan relations that 
developed from bad to worse during seven decades of 
independent history of both countries, visiting significant 
gurdwaras remained extremely difficult for Indian Sikhs. 
The procedure for pilgrimage was determined by a number 
of bilateral documents, first of all by the 1950 Agreement 
signed by India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liakat Ali Khan (Agreement 
1950) followed by other arrangements, particularly the 
1974 Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines that limited 
the annual number of pilgrimage teams from one country 
to the other to 20 parties. By 2017, India and Pakistan 
opened five shrines from each side for trans-border 
pilgrimage: the list included five Muslim shrines in India 
(two in Delhi, and one each in Rajasthan, Punjab, and 
Uttarakhand), and two Hindu and three Sikh shrines in 
Pakistan (one in Sindh, four in Pakistani Punjab) (Pant-
Mirza Agreement 2017). 
In compliance with these agreements, Sikh jathas 
(pilgrimage groups) headed to Pakistan several times 
a year to visit three historical gurdwaras, namely, the 
Nankana Sahib and Panja Sabib in the Rawalpindi 
district, and the Dera Sahib in Lahore. Such visits were 
usually timed to coincide with Guru Nanak’s jayanti 
together (Paasi, 1998:80). This is an absolutely different 
approach to borders which holds that borders are 
artefacts of dominant discursive processes that 
have led to the fencing of chunks of territory and 
people from one another (Agnew, 2008:176). 
Naturally, such processes can vary, so the meaning of the 
borders can also change with the course of time. This 
reflects the ‘Janus-faced’ character of the borders that 
reveals ‘both their conserving and expansive potential’ 
(Houtum et al., 2005:4).
The same applies to the border crossings / passages 
– parts of the border that represent contestation and 
transcendence (Kolossov & Scott, 2013:32) being 
communication points or portals to the world of ‘the 
Other’. Being an integral part of boundary-producing 
practices and discourses, in the same way as borders they 
‘can be materialized and symbolized to greater or lesser 
extents’ (Paasi, 1996). It is in the latter context that this 
paper focuses on the role of the Kartarpur pilgrimage 
crossing / corridor inaugurated in November 2019 at the 
Indian-Pakistani border. 4
4 Perspectives of the Kartarpur corridor conceptualised 
through faith-based diplomacy theory are discussed in 
Bochkovskaya, 2020:20-25.
Figure 4: Soldiers on Duty at the Attari-Wagah Crossing
Author’s Images
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Officially, the Kartarpur corridor topic was first touched 
upon in February 1999, during India’s Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee visit to Lahore (Dawn Wire Service 
February 20, 1999), where he had talks with Pakistani 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Albeit the negotiations 
focused on nuclear security in South Asia, the final 
statement (Joint Statement, 1999) noted that the parties 
would continue the dialogue on the liberalisation of the 
visa regime and border crossing rules. Additionally, 
Nawaz Sharif agreed in principle to start the corridor 
construction.
One argument in favour of building the corridor was that 
in theory it could be used not only by Indian Sikhs, but 
also by some Pakistani Sikhs,6 to access the Dera Nanak 
Sahib gurdwara (Hindustan Times, November 09, 2019). 
From a distant and most hypothetical perspective, it could 
also be used by Pakistani Muslims to visit several small 
dargahs – shrines of Muslim pirs / saints – that remained 
at the Indian side of the border after the 1947 partition 
(Snehi, 2019:106–138). From this perspective, getting 
access to religious shrines would be of mutual interest. 
The Kartarpur corridor was also perceived by the two 
sides as a channel of peace and cultural cooperation at 
the troubled border. 
6  According to various sources, the number of Sikhs in 
Pakistan is rather small, with estimates ranging from 
20,000 to 40,000.
(birthday), to Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s5 memorial day, 
and to the Baisakhi spring festival, which is extremely 
important in the Sikh tradition.
To get into the Pakistani Punjab, pilgrims had to travel 
on bypass roads filled with checkpoints. Obtaining the 
Pakistani visa usually took a long time; visa fees were 
also a problem for potential visitors, and in many cases 
Indian Sikhs were denied visas. However, Pakistani 
pilgrims willing to visit Muslim shrines at the Indian 
territory faced similar difficulties.
Some 7,000 Indians visited Pakistan-based gurdwaras 
per year (The Times of India August 22, 2018), but for 
an overwhelming majority of India’s 21-million Sikh 
community the path to these guardwaras remained closed. 
The Kartarpur Sahib also remained inaccessible; despite 
its historic significance and near-the-border location, this 
gurdwara was not on the list of religious shrines defined 
by bilateral agreements. This explains the Indian Sikhs’ 
preoccupation with the idea of establishing a dedicated 
pilgrimage corridor (Map 1) that would allow Indian 
followers of Guru Nanak to get quick and easy access 
to Kartarpur. However, government-level discussions of 
this issue began only in the late 1990s.
5  Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) established the Sikh 
Empire, which existed until the annexation of Punjab by 
the British in 1849.
Map 1: Location map of the Kartarpur Corridor
 
Google image
International Journal of Religious Tourism and Pilgrimage  Volume 9(ii) 2021
33
2009). Nevertheless, in 2000, Pakistani authorities 
formally gave consent to build a bridge leading to the 
Kartarpur Sahib over the Ravi River (The Tribune, 
November 16, 2000) and announced several tenders, but 
construction works were not launched at that time.
The talks received a new impetus in 2004 after the general 
election victory of the United Progressive Alliance led 
by the Indian National Congress; India’s new Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh, a Sikh, supported the idea 
of the Kartarpur Corridor (Sethi 2020). Also in 2004, 
the Pakistani side had the gurdwara fully repaired and 
rebuilt, possibly using funds allotted by the Sikh diaspora 
(The Times of India, May 05, 2017), as the condition of 
the shrine remained in a state of disrepair from 1947 until 
then. An unpaved road was also constructed to provide 
easier access to the shrine. 
In 2010, the Punjab Legislative Assembly adopted 
a resolution urging India’s central government to 
facilitate the setting up of the corridor (Resolution 
2010), while in 2012, the same request was addressed 
to India’s Foreign Minister by the Shiromani Gurdwara 
Parbandhak Committee – an authoritative and influential 
Sikh organisation responsible for the management 
of gurdwaras in three states (Punjab, Haryana, and 
Himachal Pradesh) and the union territory of Chandigarh. 
Following the 2014 general elections victory of the 
Hindu-focused Bharatiya Janata Party led by Narendra 
Modi, Sikhs persisted in lobbying for top-level Kartarpur 
dialogue. On multiple occasions, Sikh leaders brought 
up this issue in the Indian parliament, but in 2017, the 
parliamentary standing committee on external affairs 
ruled out the construction of the corridor noting that ‘the 
current political climate was not at all conducive’ for 
setting up the passage (The Tribune, May 02, 2017).
Nevertheless, negotiations were activated in 2018 when 
the Tehrik-e-Insaf party (PTI) headed by a prominent 
politician Imran Khan, a former cricket player, came to 
power in Pakistan. At the inauguration ceremony, India 
was represented by Navjot Singh Sidhu, Minister of 
Tourism of Punjab, formerly also a professional cricketer 
and Imran Khan’s friend since the 1980s. The ‘cricket 
diplomacy’ brought results, enhanced by upcoming 
festivities – Guru Nanak’s 550th prakash purab (birthday 
celebrations) in November 2019. Soon after Imran Khan’s 
inauguration, the Pakistani side announced its intention 
to construct and activate the Kartarpur corridor on the 
eve of an important date, which is to say by November 
However, the emerging positive trends in the negotiations 
came to naught with the beginning of border conflict 
(Kargil War) in May 1999, with the result that all 
discussion items concerning humanitarian cooperation, 
the Kartarpur corridor included, were taken off the 
agenda. 
Phases of the Kartarpur Dialogue
The Kartarpur dialogue developed in fits and starts in 
the years that followed, being largely determined by 
the personal interests of discussion participants. The 
viewpoint of India’s Sikhs remained central in the 
negotiations together with – directly and indirectly – 
the stand of influential Sikh communities in the USA, 
Canada, and Great Britain, especially of the descendants 
from the western parts of colonial India that became West 
Pakistan in 1947.7 
India’s authorities often expressed concern about security 
issues. In particular, they noted that Pakistan could 
potentially operate the Kartarpur corridor to undermine 
stability in India by using the gurdwara for tacit support 
of pro-Khalistani forces, and for recruiting radical Sikhs, 
especially young people (India Today, November 27, 
2018; Hindustan Times, November 07, 2018).8
The Pakistani side was largely concerned over logistics 
and infrastructure because Pakistan was to bear a greater 
part of the construction costs owing to the location of 
the Kartarpur Sahib. According to the American non-
governmental organisation - Institute for Multi-Track 
Diplomacy - the infrastructure expenditure including 
a highway with pedestrian and bicycle lanes, and 
checkpoints, was estimated at $2.2 million for India and 
$14.8 million for Pakistan (Kartarpur Project Report, 
7  Over 2 million Sikhs reside outside India. For details on 
the Sikh diaspora refer to Jacobsen et al., 2017; Hawley, 
2013.
8 The separatist movement aimed at the secession of Punjab 
and the establishment of the Sikh state of Khalistan got 
underway in India from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. 
It was widely supported by extremists from outside 
India. Groups such as the Khalistan Liberation Force 
and Sikhs for Justice, among others remain active in the 
USA, Canada, and Great Britain, among other countries; 
India lists them as terrorist groups. India’s media often 
report subversive activities carried out by Pakistan-
based pro-Khalistani forces, but it is difficult to evaluate 
the accuracy and reliability of such information. The 
Khalistan factor in the Kartarpur dialogue is not discussed 
in this paper.
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the altruism preached by the Sikh faith. Some Indian 
politicians called it jizya – a tax historically levied 
in Islamic countries on non-Muslims (India Today, 
September 14, 2019). The negotiations continued until 
both sides signed a final agreement on the Kartarpur 
corridor on October 24, 2019 (Kartarpur Sahib 
Agreement, 2019).
The document defined the five-year working schedule 
for the corridor, stating that it would be operational 
every day from dawn to dusk, and all pilgrims from 
India would return to their country on the same day. 
Travelling was permitted for pilgrims with valid Indian 
passports, and for people of Indian origin (PIO) carrying 
Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cards along with their 
passports. Pilgrims also had to register two weeks in 
advance at a special website of India’s Ministry of 
Home Affairs (www.prakashpurb550.mha.gov.in/). The 
maximum number of visitors was limited to 5,000 per 
day with additional provisions for more pilgrims coming 
on special days like gurpurabs or Baisakhi. In spite of 
India’s objections concerning the 20-dollar fee, Pakistan 
retained the USD20 service charge.
The Kartarpur corridor was inaugurated on November 
9, three days before Guru Nanak’s 550th prakash 
purab celebrated in 2019 on November 12. Imran Khan 
inaugurated the Pakistani part, while Narendra Modi did 
the same for the Indian part of the passage (Figures 5 & 
6). The first pilgrimage group that departed to Kartarpur 
comprised prominent Sikh leaders and politicians 
including India’s former Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh, Chief Minister of Punjab Amarinder Singh, and 
12, 2019. At that point India’s parliament took a similar 
decision, and in November 2018 both countries launched 
the construction of the corridor infrastructure.
In 2018-2019, the issue of peaceful transborder 
cooperation was seemingly removed from the agenda 
in a number of cases. This happened during the border 
conflict in February 2019 after the Pulwama (Kashmir) 
attack that saw 40 Indian security personnel killed by 
a suicide bomber, with the Indian response being an 
airstrike across the line of control. Also, in August 2019, 
when India’s government repealed the special status of 
Jammu and Kashmir as per Article 370 of the Indian 
constitution, Indian-Pakistani relations again suffered 
a setback with the escalation of military presence in 
border areas, primarily in Kashmir. The future of the 
Kartarpur corridor remained at risk, but the construction 
works continued without fail and were to a large extent 
completed by October 2019. 
Simultaneously, negotiations concerning the details 
of visa-free visits of Indian Sikhs to Kartarpur Sahib 
continued. Firstly, it was necessary to come to an 
agreement concerning the definition of what constitutes 
an official document (passport or other ID) for purposes 
of checkpoints at both sides, and preliminary registration 
for visiting the gurdwara. Secondly, Pakistan announced 
its decision to introduce a USD20 fee for all pilgrims as 
a service charge or partial compensation for expenditures 
relating to the corridor infrastructure’s upkeep. India 
insisted on fee-free entry, noting that the proposed 
sum was prohibitive for many Sikh families; besides, 
the compulsory pilgrimage fee did not comply with 
Figure 6: Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurating 
the Kartarpur Corridor at the Pakistani side on 
November 9, 2019
(Photo by AP, Livemint, Nov. 09, 2019)
Figure 5: India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
praying during the launch of the Kartarpur Corridor 
on November 9, 2019
 
(Photo by ANI, The Hindu, Nov. 09, 2019) 
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Figure 7: The Kartarpur pilgrimage website
 
Available at https://prakashpurb550.mha.gov.in/kpr/
life of the founder of Sikhism is neutral: Guru Nanak is 
neither Hindu nor Muslim. In a sense, the Sikh religion 
that historically absorbed elements of both Hinduism and 
Islam stands ‘above’ these religious systems. To this end, 
the bridge over the Ravi river that pilgrims have to cross on 
their way to Kartarpur and back acquires a metaphorical 
meaning. So it is almost impossible to suspect those in 
favour of developing trans-border contacts as taking 
either a pro-Indian or pro-Pakistani stand.
Furthermore, the Kartarpur corridor is commercially 
feasible for both sides. Already at the initial stage 
of setting up the requisite infrastructure at the huge 
premises, a substantial number of contractors from the 
Pakistani side took part in constructing a 4.5-km highway 
including the 900-m bridge across the Ravi River. Being 
interested in developing its tourism industry, Pakistan 
gets an opportunity to host more foreigners – not only 
Sikhs – interested in religious tourism.
India (especially the state of Punjab) also stands to 
benefit from the project. By November 9, 2019, a 3.5 km 
modern highway in Punjab became operational to bring 
pilgrims to the huge passenger terminal building with a 
waiting hall, and prayer and medical rooms at the border. 
The airport-like building is supposed to demonstrate 
India’s glory, prosperity and – by default – dominance. 
By setting up international checkpoints and hoisting 
the abovementioned Navjot Singh Sidhu, among others. 
For the first time in 70 years, Guru Nanak’s followers 
could follow the shortest route to the historical gurdwara; 
thus, the way to Kartarpur was open.
Perspectives of the Kartarpur Corridor
Constant tensions in Indian-Pakistani relations seemed to 
negate all efforts aimed at the Kartarpur dialogue. For this 
reason, prospects remained dim until the inauguration in 
November 2019. When the passage became operational, 
several experts remained sceptical. This scepticism has 
been exacerbated by the COVID pandemic restrictions 
and sealing of the borders since mid-March 2020. 
Nevertheless, my argument is that this project has good 
chances for further development.
Negotiations on the present state and prospects of the 
pilgrimage corridor, as well as trans-border cooperation 
in general, are to both countries’ interest; the Kartarpur 
issue is ideologically advantageous for both Pakistan 
and India to demonstrate respect to their religious 
minorities.9 Ideologically, the place connected with the 
9  In Pakistan, religious minorities (Ahmadias, Sikhs, 
Christians, and Hindus) account for less than 2% of the 
country’s 200-million population. Of India’s 1.3-billion 
population 79.8 percent are Hindus while the rest include 
Muslims (14.2 percent), Christians (2.3), Sikhs (1.7), as 
well as Buddhists, Jains, Parsees and others. 
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